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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to analyze the effect exerted by corporate social strategies on 
(short-term and long-term) corporate financial performance (CFP). To this end, we use 
data on firms listed in the Stoxx Europe 600 index and Stoxx Europe Sustainability index 
from 2007 to 2010. On the sample data, we implement random and fixed effects panel 
data methodology corrected by heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and/or cross-
sectional dependence. The results obtained show that the implementation of CSR 
strategy, the level of economic development of the country and firm size determine CFP. 
In addition, the investment in research and development influences the return on assets 
while the company’s financial slack affects the Tobin’s Q. So, companies that contribute 
to sustainable development incur higher CFP. 
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1. Introduction 
The notion that businesses have some responsibility to society apart from merely fulfilling 
their economic and legal obligations has been lingering amongst academics for some time 
(Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Sarbutts, 2003). However, only recently – since the 1950s – 
have the importance and empirical research of this topic increased dramatically. Many 
themes describing the relationship between the corporation and society as well as the 
natural environment have since been developed. The most commonly used term in the 
literature is Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Montiel, 2008; Carroll and Shabana, 
2010) followed by many alternative themes and terms such as Social Responsibility (SR), 
Corporate Citizenship, Corporate Sustainability and Corporate Social Performance (CSP) 
as well as Business Ethics and Stakeholder Management. One of the more notable debates 
regarding CSR is whether it is expedient for companies to value and act upon social 
demands. 
Along with the development of different themes and terms, different perspectives from 
which corporations view their social and environmental activities, and ultimately 
different approaches to these activities, have blossomed as well (Porter and Kramer, 2006; 
Garriga and Melé, 2004). As opposed to the generic and marketing perspectives, Porter 
and Kramer (2006) propose a strategic way to implement CSR in one’s business. If a firm 
combines its economic and CSR objectives with its core business strategy as a long-term 
commitment, then ‘CSR can be much more than a cost, constraint, or charitable deed – it 
can be a source of opportunity, innovation, and competitive advantage’ (Porter and 
Kramer, 2006, p. 80). However, most prevalent approaches to CSR are so detached from 
business that companies fail to achieve the greatest opportunities for society. This 
limitation, faced with the current economic downturn, implies that managers must 
develop highly focused and effective CSR actions after having identified which social 
issues matter most to the firm. By doing so, the firm can increase its own profit and 
strengthen its long-term competitiveness, as well as making a meaningful social impact 
and thereby achieving a win-win situation through the creation of the synergistic value 
known as shared value (Porter and Kramer, 2006; Ditlev-Simonson and Midtun, 2011). 
Given all the above, the aim of this paper is to analyze whether firms that implement 
corporate social responsibility strategies achieve higher corporate financial performance 
than those that do not it. To do this, we structure the paper as follows: the next section 
presents a review of the literature on the link between Corporate Social Performance 
(CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP). Section 3 outlines our data sources, 
measures of variables and methodology used. In section 4, the results of our regression 
models are discussed. Finally, some concluding remarks are provided. 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Nowadays, as stakeholders are showing an ever growing interest in the CSR of firms 
(Porter and Kramer (2006), Sá de Abreu (2009) and Waddock and Graves (1997)), the 
question of whether there is a relevant relationship between CSR and CFP has become an 
important theme for corporate management. This has aroused great interest among 
researchers, who have analyzed the relationship between CSP and CFP, but without 
reaching any real consensus, as shown by Beurden and Gossling (2008), Margolis et al 
(2007), Wu (2006), Margolis and Walsh (2003), Orlitzky et al (2003) and Griffin and 
Mahon (1997). 
Thus, some authors, such as Stanwick and Stanwick (1998), Waddock and Graves (1997), 
Choi et al (2010), Inoue and Lee (2011) and Ioannou and Serafeim (2012), find a positive 
relationship between corporate social performance and corporate financial performance, 
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arguing that (1) CFP leads to better CSP because more profitable companies have more 
resources to invest in socially responsible initiatives, (2) firms that implement corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) strategies could obtain: (a) better resources, attracting socially 
responsible consumers, alleviating the threat of regulation, soothing concerns from non-
governmental organizations and improving their reputation, (instrumental stakeholder 
theory), and (b) competitive advantage (resource based view theory), and (3) firms 
achieve greater legitimacy when attending to stakeholder pressures (institutional theory). 
Contrary to this, a negative relationship between CSP and CFP has been identified in a 
number of studies, such as Lee et al (2009) and Makni et al (2009). This line of research 
supports the view that corporate social responsibility activities only increase costs for 
firms, which is inconsistent with their main objective, namely to maximize shareholder 
wealth (traditional neo-classical theory). 
The failure to reach a consensus on the relationship between CSP and CFP could be due 
to (1) the different ways CFP and CSR have been defined, (2) methodological issues and 
(3) differences in the characteristics of the samples used. Thus, previous literature uses 
different criteria to define CSP. Stanwick and Stanwick (1998), Cochran and Wood 
(1984) and Orlitzky (2001) use the firm’s corporate reputation as a measure of CSP, 
finding a positive relation between CSP and CFP. Brammer and Millington (2008), 
Gallego-Alvarez (2012) and Fujii et al (2013) only take into account a specific component 
of CSP (corporate charitable giving and corporate environmental management, 
respectively) to analyze the aforementioned relationship, while Ruf et al (2001), Choi et 
al (2010), McWilliams and Siegel (2000) and Waddock and Graves (1997) use 
multidimensional CSR measures that, according to Griffin and Mahon (1997), offer an 
improvement on the largely perceptual data of the Fortune corporate reputation index. 
For this reason, in this study we use a multidimensional index (Stoxx Europe 
Sustainability index).  
On the other hand, previous literature uses a broad range of measures of CFP that fall into 
two categories: accounting-based measures and market-based measures. The most 
extensively used measures of accounting profitability are Return On Equity (ROE) and 
Return On Assets (ROA), according to Margolis et al (2007), and were also used by Inoue 
and Lee (2011), Choi et al (2010), Lee et al (2009), Makni et al (2009) and Van der Laan 
et al (2008) to capture the short-term profitability of the firm. However, these measures 
could be inappropriate, as suggested by Davidson and Worrell (1990), since the relation 
between ROE and CSP could be influenced by the level of corporate debt, so applying 
DuPond’s method, the ROE is defined as the product of the return on assets and the equity 
multiplier ratio from which a firm could increase its ROE by using more debt. On the 
other hand, the relation between ROA and CSP may be affected by the industry to which 
the firm belongs. Thus, the ROA can be defined as the product of the profit margin and 
the asset turnover ratio, which measures the ability to produce sales, which is not 
comparable across all industries. 
As an alternative to accounting measures, market-based measures of company 
performance could be used. When doing so, one of the most common measures used in 
this field of research is stock returns, as shown by Margolis et al (2007). However, 
according to Cochran and Wood (1984), this measure fails to capture the total financial 
risk, which could produce contradictory results when researchers analyze data 
corresponding to different market cycles. To overcome this drawback, some authors, such 
as Lee et al (2009) and Choi et al (2010), introduce the financial risk variable to their 
model or change the stock return to risk-adjusted return, while others, such as Inoue and 
Lee (2011), Surroca et al (2010) and Choi et al (2010) use the Tobin’s Q measure which 
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does not require risk adjustment or normalization to compare Q across firms, as suggested 
by Li and Tallman (2011). 
Using the above-mentioned measures, previous studies find that, in general, accounting-
based measures appear to be more correlated with CSP than market-based measures 
(Orlitzky et al, 2003). This, according to Gentry and Shen (2010), could be because both 
types of financial performance measures reflect different dimensions of CFP: short-term 
profitability for accounting-based measures and future or long-term profitability for 
market-based measures. 
On the other hand, overcoming the shortcomings of the above-mentioned financial 
performance measures, Brammer and Millington (2008), Wahba (2008), Lee et al (2009), 
Makni et al (2009), Choi et al (2010) and also McWilliams and Siegel (2000) have 
considered financial leverage influences, industry effects, differences in firm size, 
expenditure on research and development (R&D) and country effects in their models, 
which has allowed them to overcome the misspecification problem that arises from 
omitting variables that are important determinants of profitability. In this respect, 
Davidson and Worrell (1990) point out that accounting data could be sensitive to leverage 
considerations; therefore not controlling for leverage differences could lead to inaccurate 
conclusions. Taking this consideration into account, Brammer and Millington (2008), 
Waddock and Graves (1997) and Wahba (2008) show that less leveraged firms invest 
more in CSR. 
Different authors, such as Griffin and Mahon (1997) and Inoue and Lee (2011), point out 
that social issues change and vary for different industries because the stakeholders in each 
industry face different interests and degrees of activism regarding social issues. In this 
regard, Ioannou and Serafeim (2012) find that firms in more highly competitive industries 
show poorer social and environmental performance but better governance than those in 
less competitive industries. 
According to Huang (2010), Brammer and Millington (2008) and Brik et al (2011), 
another factor that could influence the relationship between CSP and financial 
performance is firm size. Large firms have more resources to invest, which allows them 
to benefit from economies of scale, scope and learning, and thereby achieve better 
financial performance than smaller companies. It also allows them to meet their social 
obligations in order to preserve their competitive advantage, thus improving their 
corporate reputation and social performance. 
R&D investments made by firms could be an important determinant of profitability, as 
shown by McWilliams and Siegel (2000) and Brammer and Millington (2008), in that 
firms investing in R&D seek a differentiation strategy to allow them to create competitive 
advantages and improve economic performance. On the other hand, according to Porter 
and Kramer (2006), firms that implement strategic CSR can obtain a source of 
competitive differentiation and improve their results. Therefore, a positive correlation 
between a firm’s R&D investment and CSP is expected. Thus, the omission of the R&D 
factor from the analysis of the relationship between CSP and CFP could lead to an 
overestimation of the impact of CSP on CFP, according to McWilliams and Siegel (2000), 
which has driven Choi et al (2010), Makni et al (2009), Brammer and Millington (2008) 
and Ruf et al (2001) to consider the firm’s R&D intensity in their analyses. 
Developed countries could provide the legal safeguards needed for economic growth, 
which would support the development of CSR, as shown by Ho et al (2012), who indicates 
that differences in CSP appear to be linked to the level of economic development. 
Congruent with this result, Usunier et al (2011) suggest that countries show differences 
in perceptions of the importance of social responsibility performance. For this reason, our 
study also examines this effect.  
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Another reason why previous studies have not reached any real consensus could be 
methodological issues. This is exemplified by Choi et al (2010), McWilliams and Siegel 
(2000), Makni et al (2009), Ruf et al (2001), Stanwick and Stanwick (1998) and Waddock 
and Graves (1997) using ordinary least square regression and not taking into account the 
dynamic market environment or firm specific effects, which may produce biases and 
inconsistent estimators. To overcome these shortcomings, our study takes the aforesaid 
effects into account. 
The characteristics of the samples used in previous literature are different. Inoue and Lee 
(2011) and Griffin and Mahon (1997) focus their research on one industry (tourism and 
chemical industries, respectively), while others, such as Choi et al (2010), Lee et al (2009) 
and Makni et al (2009), examine firms belonging to different industries. This could 
influence the results obtained because, as stated above, social and environmental impacts 
are different depending on the industry. For this reason, our study includes firms 
belonging to diverse industries, and controls for this factor. 
Because it strives to improve the understanding of the CSP-CFP relationship, our study 
is broader than most of those existing in the current literature and seeks to move a step 
closer to articulating conclusive findings by overcoming the above-mentioned 
shortcomings.  
 
Therefore, it is proposed that: 
 
H1: Companies that perform well in terms of CSP also perform better financially. 
 
3. Research method 
 
Sample and data collection 
To analyse the factors that affect the relationship between CSP and CFP, we have a 
database containing information relating to 600 firms for four consecutive fiscal years 
(from 2007-2010) composed of the Stoxx Europe 600 index provided by the Stoxx 
Limited Company. We consider firms included in the Stoxx Europe Sustainability index 
at the end of the year provided by the Stoxx Limited Company to present socially 
responsible behaviour regarding environmental, social and governance criteria. From the 
AMADEUS database we extracted information on the following for each year on the 31st 
of December: the ROA, the ROE, total assets, long-term debt, current ratio, free cash 
flow, R&D expenditure, ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity, the 
industry to which they belong, and the country in which their address for tax purposes is 
based. The gross national income of each country was obtained from The World Bank. 
We omit firms created after January 1st 2008, those dissolved during the period, or those 
with missing data for any of the years considered. So, our final sample includes data 
corresponding to 153 firms. Thus, according to Brown et al (1997), survival bias may 
appear as a result of excluding dissolved firms from the sample, or omitting, for 
methodological reasons, certain companies that existed in the period.  
 
Measures of Corporate Financial Performance 
Bearing in mind the available information, we consider the variables discussed below to 
be potential determinants of the CFP achieved by firms, since they are very similar to 
those used in the aforementioned previous literature. Given that Porter and Kramer (2006) 
state that firms that implement a strategic focus on CSR could generate a competitive 
advantage, which allows them to increase their own profit, we consider CFP to be a 
dependent variable while CSR is the independent variable. This causal relationship has 
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also been observed by other authors, such as Callan and Thomas (2009), Brik et al (2011), 
Chen and Wang (2011), Choi et al (2010) and Hull and Rothenberg (2008), among others. 
Thus, for CFP, we follow the previous literature and use accounting-based and market-
based financial performance measures. As accounting-based measures, we use ROE and 
ROA which, according to Inoue and Lee (2011), capture different financial aspects of 
short-term profitability. Meanwhile, ROA, defined as the net income and total asset ratio, 
represents the relative profitability of asset utilization, and ROE, defined as net income 
and shareholder equity ratio, measures how efficiently a firm is utilizing the debt 
managed, as stated by Lee et al (2009). Our market-based performance measure is Tobin’s 
Q, which captures aspects of long-term expected profitability and is measured by the ratio 
of market value of equity to book value of equity at the end of each year considered as in 
Choi et al (2010) and Lee et al (2009). 
 
Measures of Corporate Social Performance 
To measure CSP by European firms we use a dummy variable (CSP) as in McWilliams 
and Siegel (2000), based on the Stoxx Europe Sustainability index developed by the Stoxx 
Limited Company. This index, introduced in 2001, is a subset of the Stoxx Europe 600 
Index, whose components are selected according to a systematic corporate sustainability 
assessment, based on long-term environmental, economic and social criteria. Each year, 
the Stoxx Europe Sustainability index selects the companies using the Sarasin 
Sustainability Matrix, which is a combination of the company and sector ratings. A firm 
is included in the aforementioned index if it obtains a positive rating. which depends on 
its position in the matrix. Taking this into account, our dummy variable takes the value 
of one if the firm is included in the latter index and a value of zero if it has not been 
qualified for the index. 
 
Control Variables 
The control variables have been selected on the basis of previous findings in the literature. 
Industry type, country, firm size, financial slack, risk, R&D investment and year are used 
as control variables. Industry type is classified, according to the FTSE Group’s 
categorization, as low, medium and high impact depending on the environmental impact 
of the company’s operations. Thus, LIndusdry, MIndustry and HIndustry have a value of 
one if the firm is attributed to have low, medium and high activities of environmental 
impact, respectively, and a value of zero otherwise. 
Given that previous studies, such as Ho et al (2012) and Usunier et al (2011), show that 
the level of economic development could determine investment in CSR, we introduce a 
dummy variable (Rich) to our model, that takes a value of one if the firm is in a country 
with higher gross national income than the average for the European countries considered, 
and a value of zero if it is not. 
To control for the size of the company, as in Choi et al (2010), we include in our model 
the LSize variable, which is calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets. Lee et al 
(2009) point out that firms with financial slack are more likely to adopt CSR strategies 
than others with low levels of financial slack. For this reason, we include the current ratio 
(CR) in our model and the free cash flow (Cash) as proxies. Both of these were directly 
obtained from AMADEUS. 
Following Callan and Thomas (2009) and Makni et al (2009), as a proxy of risk we use 
the ratio of the firm’s long-term debt to total assets at the end of each year, this being 
represented by the Leverage variable. As in previous studies, such as Makni et al (2009), 
Choi et al (2010), Brammer and Millington (2008) and Ruf et al (2001), we take R&D 
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investment as a management preference variable, which is measured by the natural 
logarithm of R&D expenditure at the end of each year (LRD). 
Finally, given that Ducassy (2013) finds a significant positive relationship between 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) and Corporate Financial Performance (CFP) at the 
beginning of the crisis (2007) which disappears when the crisis period is prolonged, we 
control for year effects by including two year dummy variables (Year2008 and 
Year2009), like Choi et al (2010), Inoue and Lee (2011) and Griffin and Mahon (1997), 
to distinguish the three years covered by this research, taking a value of one if the data on 
the company matches the date indicated and zero otherwise. 
We verify that are no multicollinearity problems between independent variables using 
matrix correlation and running the variance inflation factor (VIF). The results obtained, 
which are shown in tables 1 and 2, indicate the absence of multicollinearity problems 
(Sharma and James, 1981). 
 
Modelling the Effect of CSP on CFP  
To analyze whether CSP is a determinant of CFP, we propose the following models, 
where the dependent variable is CFP measured by means of the ROE, ROA and Tobin’s 
Q of each firm, respectively, and the independent variables are delayed by one year to 
avoid endogenous issues, as in Makni et al (2009) and Huang (2010): 
 
Model 1 
CFPi, t=α+ β1CSPi,t -1+ β2Year2008+ β3Year2009+ β4LIndusi, t-1+ β5MIndusi, t-
1+ β6Richi ,t-1+ β7LSizei ,t-1+ β8CRi,t -1+ β9LCashi, t-1+ β10LLeveragei, t-1+ 
β11LRDi, t-1+Ɛi , t [1] 
 
First, this model is estimated using the pooled OLS regression approach, which assumes 
that all the firms involved in the analysis are homogenous and the data is stationary, 
providing biased and inconsistent regression estimators when these assumptions are 
violated. To check this, the Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random 
effects is conducted. The results show that firm-specific effects are statistically significant 
when we use ROE as a dependent variable (chi-squared (1):16.92; P-value: 0.000), ROA 
(chi-squared (1):8.80; P-value: 0.003) and Tobin’s Q (chi-squared (1):153.25; P-value: 
0.000). Thus, the random effect model provides a more efficient standard error estimator 
than the pooled OLS approach. 
 
Model 2 
CFPi, t=α i+ β1CSPi,t-1+ β2Year2008+ β3Year2009+ β4LIndusi ,t-1+ β5MIndusi ,t-
1+ β6Richi ,t-1+ β7LSizei ,t-1+ β8CRi,t -1+ β9LCashi, t-1+ β10LLeveragei, t-1+ 
β11LRDi, t-1+Ɛi , t [2] 
Where αi = α + µi, and µi being a random variable is an unobserved individual-specific 
effect. 
 
When the explicative and random variables are orthogonal, random effects estimators are 
more efficient than fixed effects estimators. In other cases, the estimators obtained by 
random effects regressions are biased and inconsistent, making it better to run fixed 
effects estimators. To test this assumption, we carry out the Hausman test, whose statistic 
shows that fixed effects estimators are more consistent than random effect estimators 
when we use ROE (chi-squared (8): 37.51; p-value: 0.000) and ROA (chi-squared (8): 
33.18; p-value: 0.000) as a dependent variable, respectively, while random effect 
estimators are more efficient than fixed effects estimators when the dependent variable in 
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our model is Tobin’s Q (chi-squared (8): 8.98; p-value: 0.344). For this reason, we 
propose these models: 
 
Model 3 
ROEi, t=α i+ β1CSPi,t-1+ β2Year2008+ β3Year2009+ β4LIndusi ,t-1+ β5MIndusi,t -
1+ β6Richi ,t-1+ β7LSizei ,t-1+ β8CRi,t -1+ β9LCashi, t-1+ β10LLeveragei, t-1+ 
β11LRDi, t-1+Ɛi , t [3] 
 
Model 4 
ROAi,t=α i+ β1CSPi, t-1+ β2Year2008+ β3Year2009+ β4LIndusi ,t-1+ β5MIndusi ,t-
1+ β6Richi ,t-1+ β7LSizei ,t-1+ β8CRi,t -1+ β9LCashi, t-1+ β10LLeveragei, t-1+ 
β11LRDi, t-1+Ɛi , t [4] 
Where αi = α + µi, being µi modelled as an individual-specific fixed effect. 
 
Model 5 
Tobini,t=α i+ β1CSPi, t-1+ β2Year2008+ β3Year2009+ β4LIndusi, t-1+ β5MIndusi ,t-
1+ β6Richi ,t-1+ β7LSizei ,t-1+ β8CRi,t -1+ β9LCashi, t-1+ β10LLeveragei, t-1+ 
β11LRDi, t-1+Ɛi , t [5] 
Where αi = α + µi, and µi being a random variable is an unobserved individual-specific 
effect. 
 
These fixed effects models assume that the errors are homoskedastic and spatially and 
temporally independent. However, O’Connell (1998) and Beck (2001) show that panel 
tests are considerably disturbed when the independence and homoskedasticity 
assumptions are violated. For this reason, like Horgos (2011), we test the hypotheses of 
homoskedasticity in the fixed effect model with the modified Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity. For model 3, this statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared 
with 101 degrees of freedom. The sample value (chi-squared (153):3,100,000, p-value: 
0.000) was higher than the critical value at 1% of significance; the null hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity is therefore rejected. The same occurs when the dependent variable is 
ROA (chi-squared (153):2,000,000, p-value: 0.000). This procedure is applied for our 
random effects model. The results obtained (chi-squared (153):1,800,000, p-value: 0.000) 
do not allow us to accept the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
According to Petersen (2009) and Fama and French (2002), the presence of serial 
correlation could underestimate the standard errors of the coefficients. For this reason, we 
also apply the serial correlation test to verify whether the data has first-order 
autocorrelation using the Wooldridge test (2002). The result of the aforementioned 
statistic for model 3 (F(1,152): 0.529 ;p-value: 0.468) shows that we can accept the null 
hypotheses of no serial correlation. In contrast, when we apply the aforementioned test to 
models 4 and 5 the statistics obtained (for (F(1,152): 27.577 ;p-value: 0.000) for model 4 
and (F(1,152): 11.418 ;p-value: 0.001) for model 5 allow us to reject the null hypotheses 
of no serial correlation.  
To verify the existence of cross-sectional independence, we implement the CD test 
proposed by Pesaran (2004), which is asymptotically consistent, as shown by Hsiao et al 
(2007). The results of Pesaran’s test are: CD= 10.286 (p-value 0.000) for model 3, CD= 
7.175 (p-value 0.006) for model 4 and CD= 2.757 (p-value 0.006) for model 5, so we 
cannot accept the null hypotheses of cross-sectional independence. 
Given that Reed and Ye (2011) show that when we use fixed effects estimations in the 
presence of heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and/or spatial correlation, we may obtain 
10 
 
biased and inconsistent estimators, we use Panel Corrected Standard Error (PCSE), which 
performs better than Parks’ Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation 
proposed by Parks (1967) when the number of time periods is equal to or greater than the 
number of cross-sections, as in our sample ( Reed and Ye (2011)). On the other hand, to 
overcome the misspecification problems in model 5, we apply the White standard errors. 
 
4. Results 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of model 3, which introduces the ROE as a 
dependent variable, using pooled OLS, random effect, fixed effect estimators, Parks’ 
feasible generalized least squares estimators and panel corrected standard error 
estimators. We can compare the estimators obtained using the different models described 
above, and find that these models present differences in terms of size and level of 
significance. This tells us that the non-compliance with the assumptions of independent 
and identically distributed (i.i.d.) errors in the traditional panel model and the existence 
of unobservable characteristics could lead us to either underestimate or overestimate the 
effect of certain variables on the CFP obtained by firms. 
The results obtained using the panel corrected standard error approach, which allow us to 
correct misspecification problems, reveal that the implementation of a CSR strategy, the 
level of economic development of the country and firm size determine the ROE of the 
firm.  
The CSP variable is positively and significantly related to the ROE of companies. Thus, 
companies with more socially responsible activities improve the shareholders’ return, 
incurring higher CFP. This result coincides with those of Waddock and Graves (1997), 
Ruf et al (2001) and Callan and Thomas (2009), in support of stakeholder theory.  
Similarly, there are significant differences in CFP depending on the level of economic 
development of the country where the firm has its address for tax purposes. Thus, the 
firms located in more developed countries obtain significantly better financial 
performance than other companies situated in less developed countries. This result 
coincides with the findings of Ho et al (2012). This could be due to the facts that 
developed countries have (1) a developed banking system that should enhance 
productivity or efficiency in the economy as pointed out by Odedokun (1996) and/or (2) 
more efficient technologies than less developed countries.  
In contrast, there is a negative and significant relation between firm’s volume of total 
assets and ROE, which could be due to larger firms having a more complex organizational 
structure, which is more formal and centralized than that of smaller firms, as stated by 
Daft (1995). This may produce inertia to change, decreasing their financial performance. 
This result contradicts with the previous empirical evidence in Callan and Thomas (2009) 
and Choi et al (2010). 
The results for the ROA equations are presented in Table 4. They show that the estimators 
obtained using the different aforementioned models also present differences in terms of 
size and level of significance, as was the case for the ROE specification. Moreover, the 
factors that determine CFP are similar to those linked to the ROE specification, with one 
exception. We find a positive and significant relationship between the ROA variable and 
CSP and the classification of the country in which the headquarters are situated, while the 
relationship between ROA and firm size is negatively significant. Regarding the 
aforementioned difference between ROE and ROA specifications, R&D investment has 
a significant and negative effect with regard to the ROA variable, which indicates that the 
benefits of investing in research and development do not compensate for the costs of 
doing so, in the short term. This finding is supported by Hart and Ahuja (1996). 
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The findings associated with the Tobin’s Q specification are shown in Table 5. In this 
case, the results show a positive and significant relationship between Tobin’s Q and CSP 
and the level of development of the country where the headquarters are located. On the 
other hand, the relationship between Tobin’s Q and firm size is negative, like in the 
findings for the ROE and ROA specifications. However, in this case we find a relationship 
between CFP and the financial slack of companies measured by the LCR and LCash 
variables. So, the results show that high q firms are more subject to free cash flow 
problems, in accordance with Jensen (1986), probably because the opportunities for 
investing the excess resources have been reduced by the financial crisis. The relation 
between Tobin’s Q and the current ratio is significant and negative, which may indicate 
that available resources are not wisely invested, increasing the investors’ perception of 
risk, as pointed out by Chen (2010). 
 
5. Conclusions and Limitations 
 
According to Porter and Kramer (2006), Sá de Abreu (2009) and Waddock and Graves 
(1997), stakeholders are becoming more and more concerned about the environmental 
and social consequences of firms’ activities. This has aroused great interest among 
researchers, who have analyzed the relationship between CSP and CFP, but they have 
reached no real consensus, which could be due to (1) the different ways CFP and CSR 
have been defined, (2) methodological issues and (3) differences in the characteristics of 
the samples used. For this reason, our main objective is to analyze the effect of corporate 
social performance on corporate financial performance while overcoming the above-
mentioned shortcomings. 
To this end, we obtain data relative to 153 firms in the Stoxx Europe 600 index for four 
consecutive fiscal years (from 2007-2010). For each firm, we have information regarding 
their inclusion in the Stoxx Europe Sustainability index at the end of the year provided 
by the Stoxx Limited Company and the ROA, the ROE, total assets, long-term debt, 
current ratio, free cash flow, R&D expenditure, ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity, the industry to which they belong, and the country in which their address 
for tax purposes is based, provided by the AMADEUS database. The gross national 
income of each country was obtained from The World Bank. 
On the sample data, we implement random and fixed effects panel data methodology 
corrected by heteroskedasticity, serial correlation and/or cross-sectional dependence. The 
results obtained show that the implementation of a CSR strategy determines CFP when 
we use ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q as a dependent variable. Thus, in the crisis period, 
companies that implemented CSR strategies obtained better financial performance than 
those that implemented traditional management strategies. Other variables that influence 
corporate financial performance, measured by ROE, ROA and Tobin’s Q, are the level of 
development of the countries and the size of firms. Companies located in countries with 
a higher level of development obtain better financial performance than those located in 
countries with a lower level of development. This could be because the former own more 
resources and more advanced technology than the latter, from which the companies 
located in more developed countries can benefit. On the other hand, larger companies 
achieve poorer financial performance than smaller ones, which could be because the 
former have a more complex organizational structure, making it more difficult for them 
to adapt to the changing environment than it is for smaller companies. 
Expenditure on research and development negatively affects the return on assets obtained 
by European firms. This could indicate that companies that implement R&D strategies 
need to invest large amounts of money to order to obtain small profits or short-term losses. 
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However, in the long term, this investment could allow them to obtain profits, albeit not 
significant, as shown by the relationship between expenditure on research and 
development and Tobin’s Q. Another factor that influences Tobin’s Q is the financial 
slack of the company, the value improving when the current ratio of the company is lower 
and the free cash flow is higher, which could indicate that the market is detecting that, in 
general, companies are not investing their available resources wisely, which could be due 
to the current economic situation reducing investment opportunities. 
Given all of the above-mentioned, our recommendation is that firms should integrate 
social and environmental initiatives in their core business strategies to gain a competitive 
advantage that will enable them to improve their corporate financial performance as 
suggested by Porter and Kramer (2006). So, firms located in developing countries should 
invest their excess resources in: (1) the acquisition of existing technologies that improve 
their productivity growth, mitigating environmental damage as stated by Coad (2011), for 
innovative activity in terms of R&D expenditure has a significantly negative relationship 
with return on asset and a weak positive association with market value (Tobin’s Q) and 
(2) to align information technology for comprehensiveness strategy with business strategy 
to gain a competitive advantage, implementing market information systems, which could 
focus on the firm’s markets and product sales, and/or interorganizational systems, which 
could improve stability with their customers and suppliers and control their socially and 
environmentally responsible business behaviour, and/or strategic decision support 
systems, which could contribute to high levels of internal and external analysis performed 
by the organization according to Sabherwal and Chan (2001) and Li and Tan (2013), 
which could reduce inertia to change and make more dynamic the decision-making 
processes of large firms. 
On the other hand, given that developed countries could have more efficient technologies, 
firms located in such countries should implement a product leadership business strategy, 
which could focus on product differences, discovery, innovation and flexibility of the 
production methods that produce competitive advantage and environmental and social 
benefits (Porter and Kramer, 2006). To improve quality and service and to maintain 
flexibility, firms’ business strategies should be to align with their workforce and 
information systems and technology, as suggested by Wang and Verma (2012) and 
Sabherwal and Chan (2001). 
For this reason, firms in developed countries should: (1) integrate human resource issues 
with their business strategy (Brewster, 2004) investing their excess resources in 
implementing human resource management systems -managed by a human resources 
professional who should be on the main company board (Jones, 1996)-, to allow them to 
attract and retain the best employees and to understand their demands as stakeholders 
who control critical supplies, products and services to adapt their management practices 
and ensure these stakeholders’ support (Wang and Verma, 2012) and (2) to align 
information technology for flexibility strategy with business strategy to gain a 
competitive advantage, implementing market information systems, which could focus on 
the firm’s markets and product sales, and/or strategic decision support systems, which 
could contribute to proactivity by helping the firm to make strategic decisions quickly 
and effectively, making the decision-making process in large firms more dynamic, as 
suggested by Sabherwal and Chan (2001) and Li and Tan (2013). 
To support the integration of these social and environmental issues in firms’ business 
operations and core strategies, the European Commission promotes public policies on 
Corporate Social Responsibility using a set of instruments consisting of financial, legal, 
partnering, informational and hybrid governance tools as shown by Steurer et al (2012), 
Steurer (2011) and Sarkar (2008). In this sense, our findings could be useful in the 
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development of the European Union corporate governance framework initiated by the 
European Commission, for our findings show that it could be useful for firms to have a 
diversified board, selecting its members on the basis of such criteria as professional 
qualifications, experience, merit, the personal qualities of the candidate, independence 
and regional backgrounds, thereby giving the firm a range of values, views and 
competencies to adopt social and environmental initiatives into its core business strategy 
and align workforce and information systems with business strategy. The composition of 
the board should be disclosed and justified by the firm, and it should be adapted to its 
characteristics (size, level of internationalization and so on). The financial performance 
obtained by the board should be evaluated by an external facilitator each year, and 
revealed to the stakeholders together with the policy risk decided for the whole firm by 
the board of directors, whose payment policy should be voted by shareholders, which 
could increase shareholder engagement and the degree of information transparency. 
Finally, there are two limitations to our study that other future work might seek to address. 
First, we do not know the score for each category of CSR that Stoxx Limited Company 
gives to each firm. Therefore, we can only analyze the overall effect of CSR activities 
and not the effect of each aspect of social corporate performance on financial 
performance. Second, our model does not take into account the effect that other factors 
(organizational structure, geographical diversification of firm, among others) may exert 
on the relationship between CSP and CFP. 
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 VIF CSPt-1  roe  roa  Tobin’s Q  Year2008  Year2009  Year2010  LIndust-1  MIndust-1  HIndust-1  
CSPt-1 1.19 1.00                    
roe  0.08  1.00                  
roa  0.07  0.82 * 1.00                
tobin  0.01  0.39 * 0.39 * 1.00              
Year2008 1.35 -0.01  -0.02  -0.03  -0.11 * 1.00            
Year2009 1.35 0.00  -0.10 * -0.10 * -0.01  -0.50 * 1.00          
Year2010  0.00  0.11 * 0.14 * 0.12 * -0.50 * -0.50 * 1.00        
LIndust-1 1.09 -0.04  -0.09  -0.05  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.00      
MIndust-1 1.10 0.05  0.02  0.02  0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.19 * 1.00    
HIndust-1  0.00  0.05  0.03  -0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.67 * -0.61 * 1.00  
Richt-1 1.11 0.12 * 0.12 * 0.16 * 0.20 * 0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.07  -0.10 * 0.14 * 
LSizet-1 3.77 0.34 * -0.14 * -0.21 * -0.36 * -0.02  0.01  0.02  -0.03  0.09 * -0.05  
CRt-1 1.24 -0.18 * 0.01  0.15 * 0.08  -0.02  -0.05  0.07  -0.12 * 0.07  0.04  
LCasht-1 3.42 0.31 * -0.09  -0.08  -0.17 * -0.04  -0.02  0.06  0.00  0.10 * -0.07  
LLeveraget-1 1.21 0.04  -0.04  -0.20 * -0.13 * -0.05  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.09  -0.06  
LRDt-1 1.15 0.04  -0.08  -0.09 * -0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.01  -0.15 * -0.10 * 0.20 * 
 
 Richt-1  LSizet-1  CRt-1  LCasht-1  LLeveraget-1 
Richt-1 1.00         
LSizet-1 -0.08  1.00       
CRt-1 0.13 * -0.28 * 1.00     
LCasht-1 0.02  0.79 * -0.08  1.00   
LLeveraget-1 -0.10 * 0.19 * -0.14 * -0.06  1.00 
LRDt-1 0.17 * 0.21 * 0.05  0.23 * -0.03 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix for Regression Variables. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant at the 10% 
level. 
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Table 2 
Dependent and independent variable descriptive statistics for variables used 
during testing 
 
 
VARIABLE MEAN MEDIAN STD DEV MIN MAX 
N. firms 153     
ROE 15.91 15.34 19.08 -153.03 191.31 
ROA 6.68 5.95 7.73 -71.82 62.20 
TOBIN 2.44 2.03 1.69 0.22 16.13 
Size* 20,146.19  5,297.20  34,160.57  108.53  262,964.00  
CR 1.67  1.46  0.89  0.11  7.28  
Cash* 1,445.13  437.35  2,629.58  0.74  20,604.50  
Leverage 0.18  0.17  0.14  0 0.68  
RD* 500.07  61.83 1,711.55  0 22,967.53  
Panel A: Continuous variable. Descriptive statistics. Expressed in millions of euros* 
 
 
 
VARIABLE CODE FREQUENCY PERCENTAGE 
BY CATEGORY 
CSPt-1 0 471 76.96 1 141 23.04 
LIndust-1 0 508 83.01 1 104 16.99 
MIndust-1 0 524 85.62 1 88 14.38 
HIndust-1 0 192 31.37 1 420 68.63 
Richt-1 0 532 86.93 1 80 13.07 
Panel B: Dichotomous variables. Descriptive statistics 
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 Pooled OLS coeficient 
Random 
Effects Coef. 
Fixed Effects 
Coef. GLS Coef. pcse coef. 
CSPt-1 
5.060 ** 3.688  -6.925  2.912 *** 5.060 ** 
(2.276)  (2.586)  (4.711)  (0.732)  (1.956)  
Year2008 
-3.864 * -3.749 ** -5.331 *** -0.873  -3.864 * 
(2.127)  (1.874)  (1.925)  (0.589)  (2.109)  
Year2009 
-5.769 *** -5.695 *** -6.172 *** -3.008 *** -5.769 *** 
(2.126)  (1.872)  (1.864)  (0.590)  (2.104)  
LIndust-1 
-4.952 ** -5.189 * omitted  -3.384 *** -4.952  
(2.401)  (2.965)    (0.881)  (3.261)  
MIndust-1 
1.298  1.231  omitted  0.239  1.298  
(2.585)  (3.190)    (0.697)  (2.952)  
Richt-1 
5.761 ** 6.003 * omitted  4.488 *** 5.761 ** 
(2.696)  (3.319)    (0.879)  (2.543)  
LSizet-1 
-2.754 ** -3.450 *** -29.500 *** -2.778 *** -2.754 ** 
(1.089)  (1.282)  (5.444)  (0.400)  (1.395)  
CRt-1 
-1.342  -1.667  -3.158  -1.001 *** -1.342  
(1.081)  (1.242)  (2.356)  (0.339)  (0.962)  
LCasht-1 
0.679  1.279  1.255  1.056 *** 0.679  
(0.989)  (1.150)  (2.524)  (0.370)  (1.477)  
LLeveraget-1 
-0.675  4.725  54.252 *** 1.471  -0.675  
(6.818)  (7.946)  (17.767)  (2.284)  (8.730)  
LRDt-1 
-0.248  -0.260  -0.220  -0.204 *** -0.248  
(0.159)  (0.194)  (1.066)  (0.046)  (0.155)  
Intercept 
71.313 *** 75.115 *** 660.371 *** 61.278 *** 71.313 *** 
(14.624)  (17.700)  (124.069)  (4.528)  (14.096)  
R-squared 0.055 0.075 0.019  0.078 
R-adjusted 0.078     
N. Observations 459 459 459 459 459 
Table 3. Regression Estimates-Dependent Variable ROE. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant 
at the 10% level 
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 Pooled OLS coeficient 
Random 
Effects Coef. 
Fixed Effects 
Coef. GLS Coef. pcse coef. 
CSPt-1 2.498 *** 2.178 ** -1.092  1.702 *** 2.138 *** 
(0.893  (0.992)  (1.923)  (0.344)  (0.791)  
Year2008 -1.917 ** -1.880 ** -2.229 *** -1.130 *** -1.809 ** 
(0.834  (0.761)  (0.786)  (0.198)  (0.801)  
Year2009 -2.518 *** -2.499 *** -2.657 *** -1.721 *** -2.439 *** 
(0.834  (0.760)  (0.761)  (0.173)  (0.722)  
LIndust-1 -0.817  -0.905  omitted  -0.484  -1.064  
(0.942  (1.110)    (0.411)  (1.342)  
MIndust-1 0.593  0.569  omitted  0.103  0.087  
(1.014  (1.194)    (0.293)  (2.085)  
Richt-1 2.682 ** 2.754 ** omitted  2.602 *** 2.699 ** 
(1.057  (1.244)    (0.431)  (1.061)  
LSizet-1 -1.328 *** -1.579 *** -10.122 *** -1.476 *** -1.808 * 
(0.427  (0.487)  (2.222)  (0.159)  (0.924)  
CRt-1 0.474  0.305  -1.345  0.547 *** 0.326  
(0.424  (0.475)  (0.962)  (0.126)  (0.424)  
LCasht-1 0.434  0.653  1.405  0.550 *** 0.933  
(0.388  (0.438)  (1.030)  (0.149)  (1.027)  
LLeveraget-1 -7.555 *** -5.642 * 19.622 *** -3.834 *** -3.944  
(2.674  (3.025)  (7.253)  (0.928)  (3.752)  
LRDt-1 -0.125 ** -0.128 * -0.175  -0.008  -0.139 * 
(0.062  (0.073)  (0.435)  (0.033)  (0.084)  
Intercept 30.740 *** 32.091 *** 210.329 *** 28.583 *** 31.599 *** 
(5.736  (6.663)  (50.648)  (2.014)  (5.772)  
R-squared 0.1422 0.1406 0.0369  0.1113 
R-adjusted 0.1211     
N. 
Observations 459 459 459 459 459 
Table 4. Regression Estimates-Dependent Variable ROA. Standard errors are given in 
parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *Significant 
at the 10% level 
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 Pooled OLS coeficient 
Random 
Effects Coef. 
Fixed Effects 
Coef. 
Robust 
Random Ef. 
Coef. 
CSPt-1 0.404 ** 0.334  0.250  0.334 * 
(0.183)  (0.203)  (0.285)  (0.191)  
Year2008 -0.565 *** -0.577 *** -0.614 *** -0.577 *** 
(0.171)  (0.111)  (0.116)  (0.132)  
Year2009 -0.296 * -0.314 *** -0.361 *** -0.314 *** 
(0.171)  (0.111)  (0.113)  (0.112)  
LIndust-1 0.158  0.180  omitted  0.180  
(0.193)  (0.289)    (0.237)  
MIndust-1 0.551 *** 0.565 * omitted  0.565  
(0.208)  (0.310)    (0.363)  
Richt-1 0.767 *** 0.833 ** omitted  0.833 ** 
(0.217)  (0.322)    (0.383)  
LSizet-1 -0.725 *** -0.613 *** -0.518  -0.613 *** 
(0.088)  (0.110)  (0.329)  (0.121)  
CRt-1 -0.193 ** -0.168 * -0.114  -0.168 * 
(0.087)  (0.100)  (0.143)  (0.095)  
LCasht-1 0.298 *** 0.173 * -0.146  0.173 ** 
(0.080)  (0.095)  (0.153)  (0.080)  
LLeveraget-1 -0.011  0.224  1.609  0.224  
(0.548)  (0.662)  (1.075)  (0.878)  
LRDt-1 0.016  0.017  0.004  0.017  
(0.013)  (0.018)  (0.065)  (0.018)  
Intercept 12.965 *** 12.827 *** 17.161 ** 12.827 *** 
(1.176)  (1.647)  (7.505)  (1.853)  
R-squared 0.2401 0.2339 0.1131 0.2339 
R-adjusted 0.2214    
N. Observations 459 459 459 459 
Table 5. Regression Estimates-Dependent Variable Tobin’s Q. Standard errors are given 
in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, 
*Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
